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“The question of the maintenance, 
or amendment, of an administrative 
frontier is, we suggest, one for 
negotiation by the Kenya Government 
with the Sudanese Government of the 
day and so far as we can see nothing in any 
Instrument (of independence) could in 
fact bind a future Sudanese government 
to the indefinite continuance of an 
administrative boundary.” 
Sir William Luce, when Constitutional 
Advisor to the Governor General of the 
Sudan, to the Chief Secretary Kenya, 
03/01/54.1 
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Above: Mt. Naita, on the South Sudan-Ethiopia border, at the northern apex of the Ilemi Triangle.
inTroducTion
The purpose of this paper is not to settle the border between Kenya and South 
Sudan. As Luce pointed out 65 years ago, that is for the governments and the 
citizens of those countries to do. Rather, it is to explain the historical dynamics 
which led to a situation whereby an international boundary in a remote part of 
Africa appears to follow three, four or even more different lines, depending on 
which map you consult. My hope of course, in setting out how this situation 
arose, is that this paper might be of assistance when the Kenya-South Sudan 
Boundary Commission goes about its work, in line with the request of the 
Organization of African States (OAU) 
that its member states, having for the 
most part not changed the borders 
they inherited from the departing 
colonial powers, should delineate and 
demarcate these borders by 2022.
We live in a world still of nation states 
in which it is widely accepted that 
the first duty of the state is the safety 
and security of its citizens. In normal 
circumstances, a state will be anxious 
to assert and define its boundaries, 
the limits of its jurisdiction and the 
ownership of its resources. For island states or groups of islands this is not so 
difficult. In Africa however, the boundaries were largely drawn by foreigners, 
who are often assumed to have been unaware of local views. They did not 
however always ignore them. 
For example, the then colonial government in Kenya, having first subdued the 
Turkana by force and then disarmed them, paid attention to their subsequent 
complaints that they were now defenceless against their better-armed 
neighbours, whilst still having similar requirements for water and grazing for 
their livestock. 
“...the first duty 
of the state is 
the safety and 
security of its 
citizens...”
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So the colonial officials of 
the time negotiated with 
their counterparts in Sudan 
a northward extension of 
Turkana grazing to encompass 
what the Turkana said they 
needed, without allowing them 
to go much beyond it. Thus a 
degree of flexibility marked the whole border issue when local interests were 
recognized, but this very flexibility stored up trouble for the future.
All borders are artificial constructs of course, a result of human attempts 
to impose some form of authority over a territory, some degree of order in 
the land. Ultimately, either a border is imposed by force and conquest, or by 
political negotiation. Despite the African Union’s operating principle that 
changing colonial borders is likely to cause more problems than it solves, 
already two new borders have appeared in Africa, that between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, in 1991, and that between South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan 
in 2011. 
In Sudan and its successor state, South Sudan, governments, imperial, colonial 
or current, have never fully addressed or resolved the question of their border 
with Kenya. The Ilemi area has been judged to be too remote and of too little 
value, a judgement which underestimates the importance of grass and water 
for the people in and around the Triangle and for their livestock. And South 
Sudan has been preoccupied by internal conflict for most of the period since 
1962 , even by some accounts since 1955. In Kenya by contrast, the colonial 
administration organized de facto flexibility in their boundary with Sudan, in 
a series of local arrangements, but their successors have so far not obtained a 
de jure boundary settlement. 
The independent Government of Kenya changed their approach in 1988, 
perhaps because at the time the Kenyans suspected there might be reserves 
of oil in the Ilemi Triangle and perhaps because they felt obliged not only to 
defend their citizens against raiders from Sudan but also to afford their growing 
population more land for their herds. So both colonial and independent 
governments in Kenya have invested time and effort to build a presence in 
the Triangle. The governments of Sudan and then South Sudan by contrast, 
have never taken very seriously the local interests of the residents of Ilemi, to 
the extent that the Condominium government in Khartoum actually paid the 
colonial government in Kenya to police a portion of the area and even gave 
its officers powers as magistrates across their border, a significant abdication 
from normal ways of ruling. 
“All borders are 
artificial constructs 
of course...”
It is not just in Africa that borders and 
border settlements become politically 
and economically important. All other 
continents have their share of border 
disputes and anomalies. So there 
is a considerable body of scholarly 
literature that examines border 
history, border law, border practice 
and border dispute resolution. 
Borders can be dynamic, reflecting 
shifts in power, as well as being 
static representations of past power. 
They can be open and welcoming, or 
closed and discouraging. The story 
of the Ilemi Triangle is in some ways 
a microcosm of the changes in the 
structures of relative power in the 
African continent over the last 120 
years. The Abyssinian empire, as it 
fractured, had for a while access to 
and exercised some powers across the 
Triangle. The arrival of a European 
power, in this case the British, caused 
the retreat of the Abyssinians. The 
British soon set about delimiting – 
or settling - the borders and drawing 
lines on their maps. Thus they 
delimited and then delineated the 
territories they had taken over, even 
if they did not always demarcate, or 
mark on the ground, those borders 
clearly.
The British also then had to learn 
about and understand the people they 
were starting to administer. In Sudan, 
as soldiers gave way to civilians in the 
administration, administrators began 
to ask people from the new discipline 
of anthropology to help them. 
But in this area the Condominium 
Government of the Anglo Egyptian 
Sudan, as it was known, bit off more 
than it could chew, so to speak, leaving 
a vacuum in the Triangle, both on the 
ground and of understanding. 
The colonial powers have departed, 
but the Ilemi area continues to be the 
scene of a certain investment by the 
government of Kenya, which has in 
the last few years devolved political 
power to its forty- seven counties. 
Today, as a result, the Governor of 
Turkana County, which contains 
oilfields now being exploited, is more 
likely to be listened to in Nairobi than 
any Turkana politician was before 
devolution. The Government of South 
Sudan meanwhile is preoccupied 
with its internal conflicts and has 
not proved able to make similar 
investments. 
Nearby, by contrast, the Government 
of Uganda claims to have largely 
disarmed the Karamojong, a group 
with the same pastoralist lifestyle 
as their neighbours in Kenya, South 
Sudan and Ethiopia, restored public 
security to their border area and 
invested in education and agriculture. 
This relative success points up the 
failures of Kenya and South Sudan in 
their border area, where cattle raiding 
continues, citizens remain armed and 
development is limited. 
The peoples of the area, who share a 
common language and culture, have 
rarely had much chance to play a 
role with regard to their future, their 
governance and their needs. It is true 
that they have been summoned to 
many peace meetings and requested the same things time and time again – 
public security, water-points, grazing rights, roads, schools and clinics. For 
most of the time no one has paid much attention and no authority has had the 
necessary resources to change the status quo or provide such benefits. Today 
that is changing, but the history of the Ilemi Triangle will continue to form the 
foundation upon which any changes yet to come will have to be structured. 
i. a diSpuTed area?
Where is the Ilemi Triangle?
In 1987, one could buy in Nairobi bookshops a “World Travel Map” dated 
that year. On it, two lines of tippex are clear, with some tippex erasures too. 
One line obliterated the horizontal line that marked the formal international 
boundary as originally defined in 1914. The other covered a line that followed 
an uneven course north of that boundary – a line that had at one time been 
called the Provisional Administrative Boundary, or PAB. And a new line had 
been drawn in, also by hand. This extended the border, on paper at least, as 
far as the area north of the Tepes Hills, which lie just south of the Ethiopian 
border with South Sudan. (See p.37.)
This author, in buying that map, had been preparing for a trip to the Turkana 
district of Kenya to try to climb a mountain called Lorienatom. In the event, 
we reached a place called Lokomorinyang, at the foot of the mountain, where 
Kenyan security forces detained us and escorted us back to Lodwar. Here, the 
District Security Officer was polite but firm. We had to return to Nairobi. And, 
in future, “would another mountain not do?” We did in fact climb Lorienatom 
some years later, with other members of the Mountain Club of Kenya, without 
any further hindrance, but greatly to the surprise of some local Turkana, who 
saw our campfire light in the evening and visited our camp early the next 
morning, armed but under a white flag, to investigate who we were and what 
we were doing.
Research in the history books revealed that the international border may have 
been delineated, i.e. drawn in on a map, and may even have been recognized 
by the peoples living in the border area, but had never been demarcated, 
i.e. indicated physically on the ground. British officials had left it to their 
successor governments in Sudan and Kenya to sort it out – which they never 
did. The result is not so much an actual dispute as an area of uncertainty, both 
physical and conceptual, a no man’s land in a distant corner of two countries, a 
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cartographic curiosity in a far place 
not much visited by senior officials 
from either capital, if at all.2 
Why might this matter ? A 2017 
NGO report suggests: 
……over the last ten years, the 
borders and their integrity have 
been gaining in importance for 
national and regional players. 
Borders are not demarcated and 
nations disagree on where the 
boundary lines are exactly in 
certain parts. With exploitable 
resources emerging as economic 
and political drivers in the 
borderland, state authorities 
have become more willing to 
stake their claim to territory 
and to enforce national border 
regimes. At the same time, clear 
border demarcation is difficult 
since the only records to work 
with date from colonial times 
and even then borders were not 
necessarily fixed. At present, a 
border commission has been 
set up to discover as much 
as possible about the exact 
locality of the borders between 
Uganda and South Sudan and 
between Kenya and South 
Sudan, using colonial records 
in Great Britain and elsewhere. 
Especially contentious is the 
area called the Ilemi triangle, 
which is claimed de jure by both 
South Sudan and Ethiopia and 
occupied de facto, at least in 
part, by Kenya.3
In 1931, at an Inter-Departmental Conference between the Foreign Office 
and the Colonial Office, the Governor General of Sudan, then Sir John Maffey, 
included in his statement the assertion that “Turkana only started to move 
north to use the grazing grounds inside Ilemi Triangle in 1915”.4 Later, the 
then Governor of Kenya, in a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
described the Ilemi Triangle as “the area North of the Kenya-Sudan boundary 
which is referred to as the Ilemi or “Ilembi” Triangle, formed by lines drawn 
from Mt. Tomadur in a South-Easterly direction along the Sudan-Abyssinia 
boundary to Sanderson’s Gulf on Lake Rudolph, thence in a westerly direction 
along the Kenya-Sudan boundary to Mount Mogila North then North Easterly 
to Mount Tomadur”.5
The first published reference to the Ilemi Triangle that the author has found 
came two years later: 
In the Southern Sudan, between the Ethiopian, Kenya Colony and Sudan 
administered areas there is a vast tract of country entirely uninhabited 
except during the rains, when members of the Taposan, Turkana and 
Ethiopian tribes drive their herds of stock into this area, as they have 
done since time immemorial, for grazing purposes. In official circles this 
immense uninhabited area is known as the Ilembi or the Ilemi Triangle.
The author, R.C.R. Whalley, once the British Consul in the Ethiopian town of 
Maji, went on to describe the extraordinary numbers of wild animals that could 
be found there at that time. This was, incidentally, the first published reference 
to the migration of the white-eared kob (an antelope found only in South 
Sudan and Ethiopia, which he mistook for a related species, the Nile Lechwe). 
Later, in 1936, the same author wrote “Alemi (or Ilemi) is the northern apex of 
the triangular stretch of country, which is more or less uninhabited, situated 
between the Sudan, Kenya Colony and Ethiopian administered areas.”6 A 
settlement in this area called Ilemi also appears on a British map from 1914. 
Some seventy five years after his first note in Sudan Notes and Records, 
Whalley’s posthumously published letters7 describe his discussions with 
an Anuak chief called Alemi, son of a Boma Murle mother and an Anuak 
father, who died not long after Whalley’s visit, at the hands of the Kichepo.8 
Unfortunately Whalley offered no explanation of why this chief’s name, in 
its various spellings (e.g. Ilembe, Elemi) became attached to the area where 
Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan meet.9
Whatever the origins of its name and whatever the definition of its Northern 
apex point, Mount Tomadur or Mount Naita, the Ilemi Triangle has been a 
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“...the borders 
and their 
integrity have 
been gaining 
in importance 
for national 
and regional 
players...”
source of constant concern to its 
administrators, firstly British and 
later Kenyan and Sudanese, and then 
to others working there more recently, 
precisely because its borders were 
never demarcated, even if at times 
they were marked by different lines 
drawn on different maps for different 
purposes. Since then, uncertainty 
about the exact location of the 
borders has been compounded by a 
confusion between the greater area, 
as described above by Whalley, and 
the smaller, more or less triangular 
area within the PAB, which has also 
been called the Ilemi Triangle.10 
For the purposes of this paper, 
the author will use the term Ilemi 
Triangle to refer to the larger area, 
as described by Whalley originally 
and as shown in more recent maps 
of Kenya. This area is enclosed by 
a line running northeast from the 
northern slopes of Mt. Mogila, the 
mountain above Lokichoggio in 
Kenya, to join the Sudan-Ethiopia 
border somewhere on the foothills 
of Mt. Naita, or slightly further to 
the northeast, at Mount Tomadur. 
The eastern side of the Triangle, the 
border with Ethiopia, runs west-east 
for some distance, from there or from 
Mt. Naita11, and then turns south 
until it reaches the shores of Lake 
Turkana. The base of the triangle 
would be the horizontal line from 
Mt. Mogilla’s northern slopes east to 
a point on or near Lake Turkana, the 
original, presumed border line which 
I shall refer to as “the 1914 Line.” (See 
Map 1 and Google satellite photo.)
This horizontal line forming the base 
of the Triangle is the nearest one 
can find to a de iure international 
boundary between Kenya and South 
Sudan. There has been no real 
dispute, as such, since the Ethiopians 
challenged the British drawing of their 
boundary with Sudan in 1906 – when 
Ethiopia was Abyssinia and Sudan 
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. 
The British line prevailed and was 
shown in all subsequent maps until 
the 1980s. To compound the picture, 
what is today Turkana County in 
Kenya, was once part of the Uganda 
Protectorate and was, as Lake Rudolf 
Province, only transferred to what 
was then Kenya Colony in 1926. (See 
below ch. III.)
Who Goes There?
At this time, the Turkana people in 
Kenya, the Toposa in South Sudan 
and Dassenetch in Ethiopia all live 
adjacent to the borders of their 
three respective countries while the 
Nyangatom live astride the Sudan-
Ethiopia border on the eastern side 
of the Triangle. (It is also sometimes 
said that the Didinga people of 
South Sudan use the grazing in the 
Triangle, but I have not heard this 
corroborated.) All these groups may 
be found in the Triangle but borders 
are not marked on the ground and so 
people cross them without hindrance, 
whether in pursuit of water, grazing 
or their neighbours’ cattle. There is 
little settlement in the Triangle itself, 
except where Kenya is extending its 
presence. As climate, weaponry and 
governments all change, so too does 
the local and international balance of power and thus the areas which, at any 
one time, groups of pastoralists may claim as their own. The possible presence 
of minerals and the ready availability of guns also affect how much the border 
peoples feel the effects of central government and how much they are left to 
their own devices. 
In the case of the peoples in and around Ilemi, the Toposa, Jie, Nyangatom, 
Karamojong and Turkana speak mutually intelligible dialects of a common 
language, trace their origins to common ancestors and refer to themselves as 
Ateker. Also Ateker speakers are the Teso and Dodoth in Uganda. (In the past, 
outsiders often referred to these peoples as the “Karamojong Cluster”.) The 
Dassenech, also known as Merille and, long ago, as Gelaba, speak an unrelated 
language, as do the Murle and the Kichepo, but they too herd livestock in 
search of pasture, whilst farming, hunting and fishing when they can.
The Toposa and the Turkana are probably the most numerous groups in and 
around the Triangle. Lack of a recent census makes it hard to know.12 The 
Condominium government of the then Anglo-Egyptian Sudan brought the 
Toposa under administration only in 1928, setting up the station of Kapoeta 
for this purpose and installing Geoffrey King, an officer in the King’s African 
Rifles, as the District Commissioner in 1931. That appointment would last 
until 1953 (see below pp 26-29). In Kenya, the Turkana were only brought 
under civil administration in 1929, after eight years of military rule.13 To the 
east of the Toposa are found their “uncles”, the Nyangatom (known also as the 
Bume in Ethiopia and in Kenya as the Donyiro). To the southwest, along the 
eastern borders of northern Uganda, are the Karamojong. Along and east of 
the Boma Plateau, into Ethiopia, are the Kichepo, also known as the Suri. To 
the west of the Toposa in South Sudan lie the lands of the Didinga. Lastly, the 
Dassenech, also known as the Merille, come into the Triangle from Kenya and 
from the Omo Delta area of Ethiopia. 
All these peoples are to a greater or lesser extent cattle-keepers. They all 
cultivate too, if and when they can, but remain mobile in the constant search 
for dry season pasture for the animals on which they depend. Small stock, 
such as sheep and goats, are important too and camels are increasingly 
being bought, as pastureland becomes drier than in the past, since camels 
are browsers, rather than grazers, and are better adapted to arid conditions. 
However close they may be linguistically, ethnically or culturally, these groups 
fight each other for pasture and cattle if necessary. They also inter-marry, 
practising what has been called in other contexts “intimate enmity.” The 
Toposa do not however fight with the Nyangatom, with whom they sometimes 
live, whereas they have both raided the Turkana as long as written records 
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fled to in 1924, which was allocated 
to them in 1938 by the delineation 
of the PAB. (See Ch. 3 below). When 
on the other hand a Turkana chief 
stated, in the 1990s, that his people 
had always grazed the land to the 
north of the provisional boundary, 
a Nyangatom elder responded 
that this was not so: he had been 
born in this area, his father had 
been a chief in it and is buried 
there.19 When the Italians occupied 
Abyssinia, they told their British 
counterparts that the Merille had 
always grazed between Kibish 
and Lorienatom and could not do 
without this resource.20
So the question of who is using 
which pasture - or who has home 
areas where - is always subject to a 
time qualification. And borders are 
fluid where no government rules, 
rains are variable and all herders 
are armed. In this context, one 
might find useful the - possibly 
apocryphal - saying of a Somali 
herdsman when asked the limits 
of the grazing land available to 
him. His answer: “The limits of 
my grazing lands are where the 
furthest of my animals is found.”
Ecology and Pastoralism
Such is the climate and such the 
soils of this semi-arid part of 
East Africa, that it could be said 
that its main products are grass 
and thorn trees, food for both the 
grazing and the browsing animals 
upon which human life in the area 
depends. The dry season lasts, 
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“...borders are 
fluid where 
no government 
rules...”
have been kept, just as the Turkana have raided them and continue to do so 
today. This reciprocal raiding has also been interspersed with periods of peace.
This sketch of the people who live in, enter or cross the Triangle is of course 
cursory and lacks the necessary dimension of time. As noted above, for 
example, the then Governor General of Sudan, Sir John Maffey, included 
in his statement the assertion that “Turkana only started to move north to 
use the grazing grounds inside Ilemi Triangle in 1915.”14 After World War I, 
the Merille (Dassanetch) pushed the Ngwatela Turkana southwards beyond 
the mountains of Lorienatom and Lokwanamur (also known as Kaitherin),15 
while the territory of the Toposa extended to the south of the Mogila Range. 
Again, before Sudan’s second civil war, it is said, the Toposa did not go east 
of the Lopotokol River. Now they are to be found living with the Nyangatom 
in settlements at the foot of Mt. Naita as well as in Ethiopia. In more recent 
times, the Ethiopian government asked the authorities in South Sudan to take 
back those Toposa and Nyangatom who have taken land in Ethiopia from the 
Mursi. This is because they are well armed and expansionist, having suffered 
at the hands of the SPLA early in the second Sudan civil war and then reached 
an agreement with them later, which left them free to pursue new grazing and 
land to the north-east, given that they could not easily expand southwards 
amongst the Turkana. 
On the northern borders of Kenya, the Toposa and Nyangatom are feared. To 
listen to the Turkana there, one would believe they are innocent victims of 
Toposa raiding. Some no doubt are, but if you ask the Nyangatom or Toposa 
you meet inside South Sudan, they will say they live in constant fear of 
Turkana raids. Intimate enmity is reciprocal. These neighbours know each 
other and share a common language and culture. They have been the subject of 
innumerable peace initiatives and meetings over the years and will cooperate 
when it suits them. Currently South Sudan’s weakness is an opportunity 
for the Turkana and they have pushed into the Triangle, where the Kenya 
government has established administrative offices in Kibish16 and maintains 
the colonial police posts which run roughly along the PAB (Koiasa, Kaimothia, 
Lokomorinyang, Liwan, Kokuro and Namoruputh.) The Government of Kenya 
is also beginning to build roads and the missionaries of St Paul, since 2001, to 
dig dams and drill boreholes for the people.17 
In colonial times on the other hand, the British administrators were clear in 
their view that the Turkana were Kenya’s responsibility and the Toposa that 
of Sudan, while the Nyangatom were held at bay and told to pay their taxes in 
Ethiopia.18 The Turkana themselves have for long claimed dry-season grazing 
and water in the valley between Lokwanamur and Lorienatom, the area they 
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approximately, from November to 
April and the rains fall any time 
between April and October. Ilemi 
has thus been characterized as 
both waterless and as a swamp, the 
judgement depending largely on the 
time of year. This climate and habitat, 
as elsewhere in Africa, has given rise 
to a livelihood system and a cultural 
outlook which value livestock above 
all else, not principally as a source of 
meat, but rather as a source of milk, a 
store of wealth, a means of exchange 
and a means of binding families and 
clans together in marriage, through 
the exchange of bridewealth. Of 
course, some food is grown too, but 
the search for water and feed for 
livestock is a defining feature of 
human existence in and around the 
Triangle – and a source of conflict 
also.
There is today a threat to the regional 
ecology, including that of the Ilemi 
area, from Ethiopia’s construction 
of the Gibe III and Gibe IV dams 
in the Omo Valley. The Omo River 
is responsible for up to 90% of the 
inflow of water and nutrients to 
Lake Turkana, at the south eastern 
corner of the Triangle. When the 
Omo flooded naturally, some of 
its waters would flow overland, 
collecting in depressions and 
also the former Sanderson’s Gulf, 
thereby contributing to a recharge of 
underground aquifers. Although the 
dam sites are up to 600 kilometres 
upstream from the lake, as Gibe III 
filled in 2015 to 2016, it lowered the 
level of the waters of Lake Turkana 
by two metres, albeit temporarily. 
Gibe IV will reduce the lake level a 
lesser amount but will emulate the 
flow regulation of Gibe III.21 If this 
were all, its effects could perhaps be 
accommodated, but the dams will not 
only provide electricity for Ethiopia’s 
development, but will also create 
a regulated flow downstream to 
provide reliable year-round water to 
enable the development of irrigated 
commercial farming on a large scale 
in the Omo Valley. A new artificial 
regime of water release will be the 
result. It is also likely that the interests 
of power generation and irrigated 
commercial agriculture will be given 
precedence over the re-creation of 
some kind of natural cycle of inflows 
into in the lake. The probable loss of 
half of the lake’s inflow from the Omo 
is predicted eventually to reduce 
Lake Turkana to two small lakes. 
Yet there is still no comprehensive 
environmental impact assessment 
of this development that takes into 
full consideration the impacts both 
in Ethiopia and over the border in 
Kenya.
 
Despite international laws governing 
water use by riparian states, Kenya 
appears to have made little progress 
in assessing or mitigating, with 
Ethiopia, the effects of this dam and 
the consequent irrigated plantations 
not just on the level of Lake Turkana 
but also on the ecology of Turkana 
County. Here many people depend on 
fish stocks in the lake, the breeding 
cycles of which will be disrupted by 
the new water regime being created 
in the Omo Valley. The ecology of the surrounding flood plains will also change 
and the livelihoods of Turkana and Dassenetch communities will be affected. 
One possible consequence could be “environmental refugees” - pastoralists 
moving further into the Ilemi Triangle, seeking grazing and water there, with 
unknown ramifications on the dynamics of conflict in the area.
There were within recent memory other users of the Triangle too: the huge 
numbers of wild animals described by Whalley, which moved in and out of 
the area according to the seasons.22 There was also said to be an antelope 
migration northwards out of the Lotagippi swamps.23 Today, little wildlife 
is seen wherever there is a road – which means broadly on the edges of the 
Triangle - as firearms have taken their toll. The once ubiquitous dik diks 
seen on the road from Narus to Nanyangacor have disappeared, for example, 
and elephants, which were once so numerous they gave rise to stories of an 
elephant graveyard at the foot of Moru Akippi, near Loelli (just north of the 
Triangle), are now rarely seen, although they do still move through the area 
from time to time.24 
In the centre of the Triangle, a 2008 aerial survey showed that the habitat was 
still used by elephants on the move, and also contains populations of Bright’s 
Gazelle, Beisa Oryx and Lesser Kudu .25 There are probably Eland still there 
too. To the south, there is talk in Kenya of making Lotagippi, the wetland 
next to the boundary, into a game reserve and Kenya Wildlife Service officers 
reportedly visit the area to this end. 
To the north and west of the Triangle however, the extensive floodplains of 
the White Nile still allow the great migration of white-eared kob to continue, 
from their dry season refuge in the Guom swamps in South Sudan and 
Gambela in Ethiopia, to their wet season haunts in the north and the east 
of Badingilu National Park and beyond, on the Kidepo floodplain. In certain 
seasons, some kob may move into the Triangle too, but there they suffer at the 
hands of any armed people they encounter. During the SPLA war, the author 
received reports of Toposa and Lafit warriors using the kob for target practice. 
Today, much the same thing is reported to be happening to the smaller, sister 
migration, that of the Tiang, Damaliscus Korrigum, along the Duk Ridge, east 
of the Nile.
Minerals
An oil concession map that the National Oil Corporation of Kenya (NOCK) has 
produced shows the Kenyan border as a line from Mt. Naita to Mt. Mogilla (see 
below, p.23). In fact Block 11 is partially in South Sudan and partially in Kenya, 
if one accepts the 1914 line. Clearly, if oil were found within the Ilemi Triangle 
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It is of course possible that there 
is oil still to be found under the 
pastures and swamps of Ilemi, but 
no major surveying or drilling has 
been conducted there of which there 
is public record and thus no clear 
conclusion can yet be drawn, however 
promising the geology may appear. 
As regards other minerals, the blue, 
apparently semi-precious stone one 
can pick up in the Triangle turns out 
to be syenite, worth perhaps $10 per 
tonne, according to the mineralogist 
to whom this author took a sample 
some few years ago. But gold, in both 
alluvial and reef deposits, is artisanally 
mined in several parts of South Sudan, 
including the lands of the Toposa, so it 
would not be a surprise if there is gold 
in the Ilemi Triangle too. 
From time to time there are also reports of diamonds coming out of the area. 
There are also often rumours of a mythical substance called “red mercury” in 
South Sudan, which locals used to try to sell foreigners.28 
 
Given the potential mineral wealth of the area, what is the legal status of the 
Triangle, insofar as it has been determined? And in what sense is it “disputed”?
ii. legal conSideraTionS and local KnoWledge
Four of the key considerations in the determination of international borders 
are treaties, maps, diplomacy and effective administration.29 These are 
explored below. The African Union has, for Africa at least, added some further 
dimensions, which are also detailed and discussed briefly below.
Treaties
An international delineation of the European occupation of Africa began, in 
effect, with the Berlin Conference, which was attended by thirteen European 
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and exploited by a company operating out of Kenya, using this concession 
map, and if there were disagreement over borders between Kenya and South 
Sudan, the risks of conflict would rise. 
In 2007, Block 11 was given to a company called CAMEC, which belonged at 
the time to the retired English cricketer Phil Edmonds (whose White Nile 
Petroleum company had tried previously to oust Total from a part of its 
concession in Jonglei State, S. Sudan, without success). CAMEC and White 
Nile carried out seismic surveys in the area in 2008. Since then the Block was 
split into two parts and a Spanish-run company called CEPSA worked out of 
Lokichiggio in the western part, Block 11A. Their Operations Director reported 
to the author in December 2014 that they did not go north of the 1914 Line, 
which is shown, without explanation, on the NOCK concession map. It was 
later reported, in 2017, that CEPSA and US oil company EHRC had withdrawn 
from Block 11A, explaining that their well Tarach-1 had proved to be dry.26 In 
2017, the website of Kenya’s Ministry of Energy and Petroleum still showed 
CEPSA to have Block 11A, while Block 11B does not appear to have been re-
awarded.27 
This eastern part of the concession, 11B, covers 14,000 km. sq. and was, 
in 2012, granted to a relatively new Scottish oil and gas company called 
Bowleven, which otherwise works mainly in Cameroun. This company carried 
out surveys south west of Kibish, according to its annual report, working with 
a local company called Adamantine, and was expected to report the results 
of its ongoing seismic survey before its concession was reviewed by NOCK in 
May 2015. Bowleven’s 2016 Annual Report records:
The Group also allowed its exploration licence in Kenya (block 11B) to lapse 
at expiry on 26 May 2016. With the financial obligations under the initial 
licence phase for this block met it was concluded that further investment 
in the licence was not merited. The majority of Bowleven’s share of spend 
in Kenya was funded under a strategic partnership with First Oil.
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“It is of course possible 
that there is oil still 
to be found...”
Oil exploration in the Ilemi Triangle.
nations and the USA. It led to the “Scramble for Africa”, as later historians 
dubbed it. The conference opened in November 1884 and continued until 
February 1885, ending with a multilateral, international treaty, known as the 
“General Act” and signed by representatives of fourteen countries, to which 
the inhabitants of the continent were not party. Its effect was to divide Africa 
into spheres of influence30 , to be exploited and administered by the Portugese, 
British, French, Germans, Italians and Belgians. Only modern-day Liberia, 
Morocco and Ethiopia were left out of this scheme. Whilst the conference 
did indicate spheres of influence, it did not draw colonial boundaries, as is 
sometimes supposed. These took much longer to establish, whether by treaty, 
negotiation or conquest, and they resulted in a patchwork of states that is 
often lamented today as completely illogical, since it was designed in the main 
to satisfy the interests of the European trading and military powers of the 
time. Apart from the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993 and of South 
Sudan from the Republic of Sudan in 2011, this patchwork remains in place, 
for want of a feasible alternative.
The General Act included an acceptance of the rights of the Belgian sovereign 
to the Congo Free State, an agreement to end slavery, the encouragement of 
free trade, and a requirement for effective administration in support of any 
territorial claims, a requirement discussed further below in the context of 
Ilemi. 
The actual development of colonial administration across the continent in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought with it European notions of 
sovereignty, landholding and territorial occupation which have neither entirely 
superseded nor yet been replaced by or fully integrated with indigenous 
systems. It was an essential feature of the development of industrial societies 
that land could be bought and sold and thus required “title”, but maps, 
sovereignty of states within fixed borders, and title deeds for landowners were 
foreign innovations in Africa. Here the European approach was to draw maps 
based on the work of survey teams who walked the ground and drew borders as 
lines on a page. Where there were few people or few natural features, such as 
in the Sahara Desert, these lines tended to be straight. Thus was imperial and 
colonial sovereignty shown on paper. On the ground, there might be beacons, 
trig points and cairns too, but not for most borders. Despite the partial 
adoption of such systems and their adaptation to local contexts, conflict over 
access to, use of, rights over, or title in land remains commonplace across the 
continent today. 
In some cases the European officials made treaties with local leaders they had 
identified and in some cases they did not. In time, the colonial powers felt 
able to change these treaties too as, 
for example, when they moved many 
Maasai from present day Laikipia 
to Southern Kenya.31 In some cases 
British administrators tried to keep 
the members of one ethnic group in 
the same territory, e.g. the Toposa in 
Sudan or the Turkana in Kenya, and 
in some cases they did not, e.g. the 
Acholi and the Zande, whose lands 
are divided by the colonial borders 
with Uganda and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and the Central 
African Republic respectively. Later, 
the effects of the two world wars of 
the twentieth century led to loss of 
colonies, boundary modifications 
and mandated territories, where one 
colonial power took over territory 
from the defeated power, as for 
example when the UK took over 
Tanganyika from Germany in 1918.
Thus the impact of the Berlin 
Conference, the arrival of 
European powers, their ideas 
about landholdings, the wars of 
the twentieth century and the 
departure of the Europeans have led 
to a subsequent profusion of claims, 
cartographic confusions and areas 
of discontent. In 1964 therefore, the 
then Organization of African Unity 
adopted the principle that colonial 
boundaries should be left intact, 
since any revision was likely to raise 
more problems than it was designed 
to solve.32 This approach is often 
summed up in Latin “uti possidetis, 
ita possideatis” (what you hold so you 
may continue to hold). 
At risk of simplification therefore, the 
collectively agreed African approach 
after independence was based upon 
treaties written by colonial powers, 
sometimes with other powers, 
sometimes with local leaders, using 
the maps the colonial powers made as 
supporting documents. Hence, when 
examining the status and origins 
of a modern African border, the 
colonial treaties are usually the first 
documents to which any claimant has 
to make reference.
Maps
Next come maps. A map can be drawn 
by anyone, can be altered and can be 
wrongly drawn, or over-simplified, or 
based on incorrect information. It is 
important therefore that interested 
parties understand the provenance of 
any map, its date, its authorship and 
its purpose. A map by itself is not a 
sufficient witness to a border – hence 
the increasingly common portrayal 
on Kenyan and other maps too of a 
45 degree line from Mt. Mogila north 
east to Mt. Naita is not proof that that 
is a recognized international border. 
A map that illustrates the agreements 
in a treaty, on the other hand, is 
a useful witness. And maps are 
useful also in that a given area can 
be visualized and appreciated in 
its different sections and features, 
something which is much harder to 
do through the dry, legal prose of the 
average treaty. Maps imply knowledge 
and understanding and they also 
suggest control. In the colonial era, 
the Survey Department of any colony 
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or territory was an important cog in 
the wheels of government. 
In Kenya for example, “the 
Department of Surveys, commonly 
known as Survey of Kenya (SOK), is 
the official agency of the government 
of Kenya on all matters affecting land 
surveys and mapping. It has been in 
existence since 1903 and is one of the 
oldest Departments in the country. 
The department is responsible for 
national surveying and mapping.”33 
It was possible for members of the 
public in Kenya in the 1990s to 
request permission from the Survey 
Department and the Ministry of 
Defence to buy whatever maps 
they wanted from this successor 
department to the colonial survey 
office. Today security concerns have 
made the process less straightforward 
and the website of the Ministry of 
Lands and Physical Planning, which 
oversees the Survey of Kenya, does 
not offer any maps for sale.34 In post-
secession South Sudan, there is no 
longer a survey department, and few 
maps have survived the years of war 
and loss. When the two countries 
separated, the Survey Department 
in Khartoum carried on, with its 
collection of maps of what had been 
one nation, which were based largely 
on the extensive series of maps 
produced by British Surveyors. In 
2011 the Office of the Vice President 
in Juba even produced a map that 
showed the same alignment of the 
south-eastern border as found on 
recent Kenyan maps. When officials 
realized what they had done, they had 
hastily to issue a corrected version, 
which now showed the alignment of 
1914. 
On the ground, the arrival of GPS 
and satellite technology has made 
redundant the old foot safari 
with theodolite and compass. 
Computing power too has enabled 
the development of digital mapping 
systems, such as Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS). The result 
is that maps can be made to measure 
and customized for whatever layers 
of data the creator might wish to 
include. So in South Sudan today, it is 
possible to visit a small UN unit in Juba 
in which a collection of maps is kept 
on paper and digitally. A catalogue 
can be consulted and the map chosen 
can be called up on screen, or found 
on paper, and then reproduced on a 
large-scale printer, or transferred 
to a flash drive. (That said, however 
sophisticated the digital display 
on a screen, however beautiful the 
printed copy, there remains a need 
for “ground truthing.” Thus the 
University of Berne Topographic 
Base Map series for Southern Sudan, 
impressive and detailed as they are, 
are a palimpsest of the maps that 
precede them, and show roads where 
none exist and villages whose name 
no one today recognizes.)35 
There is one further implication of the 
availability of hand-held GPS devices. 
If international colonial borders can 
be traced on colonial maps by their 
latitude and longitude, along with 
such geographical features as remain 
identifiable today, as most sections 
of the international borders of South 
Sudan can be, then they and their 
key inflexion points could in turn be 
identified relatively easily and then 
marked on the ground too.36 
AU Border Diplomacy
Since 1964 the OAU and its successor, 
the African Union, have invested 
a certain amount in preventing 
or resolving border issues and 
assisting member states deal with the 
consequences of the borders drawn 
by others long ago. The AU calculated 
that Africa’s borders extend for 
170,000 km. but that only around 
35% of these borders are demarcated 
while there have been some forty 
border disputes since independence. 
Meanwhile the growth of population 
in the continent suggests that the 
total number of inhabitants will rise 
from 1.185 billion in 2015 to 2.478 
billion by 2050. Pressures on land will 
only increase.
In 2007, to support its member states 
in this area, the AU established an AU 
Borders Programme (AUBP), overseen 
by a Technical Working Group 
charged with its implementation. 
The subsequent Draft African Union 
Border Governance Strategy of 
December 2016 is intended to cover 
the period 2016 to 2026 and states:
“The principle of the respect of 
borders existing upon achievement of 
national indepen-dence is enshrined 
in the Charter of the OAU, Resolution 
AHG/Res. 16 (I) on border disputes 
between African States, adopted by 
the ordinary Session of the Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government 
of the OAU, held in Cairo, Egypt, 
in July 1964, and article 4 (b) of the 
Constitutive Act of the AU (2002)”.37
It goes on to outline the following:
Vision 
A continent of peaceful, prosperous 
and integrated borders that enables 
effective peace, security, stability and 
economic and social development. 
Mission 
The mission of the strategy is to 
develop a shared and inclusive 
governance of borders that contributes 
to the African Union’s Agenda 2063. 
Objective 
To put in place a new form of 
pragmatic border governance aimed 
at promoting peace, security, stability, 
but also at facilitating the integration 
process and sustainable development 
in Africa.
Subsequently, the Strategy adds five 
“pillars” in support of the above:
1. Development of Capabilities for 
Border Governance 
2. Conflict Prevention, Border 
Security & Transnational Threats 
3. Mobility, Migration & Trade 
Facilitation 
4. Cooperative Border Management 
5. Borderland Development & 
Community Engagement 
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The intention is to prevent or to 
manage border conflicts and to assist 
member states to turn borders into an 
asset rather than a liability, to make of 
them bridges, not barriers, a resource 
for greater continental integration. 
To that end, the AU has also produced 
a brief booklet which suggests five 
means of dispute resolution: the 
United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC); negotiation; diplomacy 
using a third party; judicial; and 
arbitration.38 The emphasis here is 
thus on border management rather 
than border demarcation.
Local Knowledge
A further dimension of the AU Border 
Strategy is explained on page 9: “The 
African Charter on the Values and 
Principles of Decentralization, Local 
Governance, and Local Development 
(2014) stipulates the principles of 
subsidiarity and the inclusion and 
participation of communities. As 
such, the role of States and national 
authorities remains subsidiary to 
interventions by local authorities 
and communities, which are the first 
responders to threats and are the first 
concerned with the development of 
borderlands. In border governance, 
the engagement of stakeholders at all 
levels of intervention is a prerequisite 
for success and sustainable impact. 
The State needs to promote 
subsidiarity and partnership and 
to build local capacities, not only 
at the level of the state, but also 
at the level of local communities. 
Thus, participation and community 
engagement should be seen as an 
extension of the application of the 
principle of subsidiarity through 
decentralization and local authorities 
and representatives of local 
communities must be able to fully 
participate in border governance.”
Where Europeans and Americans 
usually have recourse to written 
records, Africans will often still 
consult their elders and their 
memories. Where did your family 
graze its herds? Where are your 
grandparents buried? Where do you 
buy your supplies? Do you vote? Do 
you pay taxes? If so where and to 
whom? etc. Whether the answers of 
respondents match official records 
or not, perception is all. It is thus 
perfectly possible for both claimants 
of a border area to believe they are 
its rightful owners, whatever long-
forgotten archives may reveal. So 
if border settlement agreements 
are to have credibility, local and 
international, and therefore to be 
more likely to last, all opinions 
must be consulted. As Martin Pratt 
put it: “The human archive can be 
quite telling”.39 In 2016, when the 
joint South Sudan-Uganda Border 
commission visited the border areas 
they were tasked with demarcating, 
they made sure they spoke with local 
elders.40 It is the intention of the South 
Sudan-Kenya Border Commission to 
do the same thing. 
Effectivité
Another legal concept that needs to 
be explored further is that of effective 
administration. This concept 
appeared after the Berlin Conference of 1884, since the would-be colonizing 
powers had to act to establish administrations in the spheres of influence they 
had allotted themselves, failing which other powers might regard them as terra 
nullius – land belonging to no one – and move in. So it has been said that “Title 
flows from effective possession over time”.41 Claimants in a border dispute 
therefore may be asked to produce evidence of effective administration: 
provision of services, such as security, water, health or education; registration 
of births and deaths; payment of taxes; mineral concessions; or local 
administration. There is a caveat to this idea: in international law, the use 
of force to conquer or annex territory is unlawful, unless sanctioned by the 
UNSC.
iii. imperial hiSTorY
The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1898-1955
After the Battle of Omdurman, or Kerreri as the Sudanese know it, in 1898, 
the victorious General Kitchener and his army had also seen off the French 
officer Marchand at “the Fashoda Incident” on the Upper Nile, with the result 
that France withdrew from this particular arena of imperial competition. 
Afterwards Anglo-Belgian negotiations over the Belgian presence in Lado 
and the Bahr el-Ghazal took place at which it was agreed that, after the death 
of King Leopold, the Belgians would evacuate the area known as the Lado 
Enclave. (This is west of the Nile from Jebel Lado, just north of today’s Juba, 
southwards into what is today Uganda.) The Belgians thereafter stayed within 
the limits of the borders they had drawn in the Congo. So the British achieved 
their objective of control of the Nile Valley and the headwaters of the Nile. 
The victory over the Mahdist forces of the Khalifa at the Battle of Omdurman 
led to the establishment of a hybrid form of rule over the Sudan for the next 
56 years and the establishment of the borders of the country as they were 
until 2011. This odd creation needs to be understood because its boundaries 
could not be set or changed by one imperial power alone, in this case Great 
Britain, but, in principle at least, had to receive the consent of the other “Co-
dominus”, in this case Egypt. 
This unusual arrangement of “Co-Domini” arose because after 1882 the 
British oversaw the economy and governance of Egypt, without making it 
formally a part of the British Empire, Egypt itself being nominally a part of 
the Ottoman Empire until 1914.42 The overthrow of the Mahdist rule in Sudan 
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was presented by the British as 
the reestablishment of Ottoman 
Egypt’s authority, not British 
conquest, and the Condominium 
was created to give legal form to 
that claim. The British involvement 
in Egypt’s government lasted only 
until 1922, when Egypt became 
independent – still as the co-
dominus of Sudan - whereas British 
military occupation of Egypt lasted 
for decades after that. 
In 1924, Egyptian nationalists 
assassinated Sir Lee Stack, the 
British Governor General of the 
Sudan and Sirdar (Commander in 
Chief) of the Egyptian Army. This 
led to the removal of Egyptian 
soldiers from the Condominium, 
the creation of the Sudan Defence 
Force, which employed Sudanese 
soldiers, under British officers, 
and the ending of the role of 
some Egyptians employed as 
administrators and doctors in the 
Condominium. The role of Egypt 
came back to haunt the British 
administration and Sudanese 
activists as independence 
negotiations got underway in the 
Sudan in the 1950s and Egyptian 
politicians advocated the “Unity of 
the Nile Valley”.
The British Empire employed a 
variety of terms to refer to the 
different legal regimes used 
to administer the territories it 
controlled – colonies, protectorates, 
mandated territories and, twice, 
“condominium”, according to the 
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circumstances that surrounded their 
acquisition.43 The oddities of imperial 
nomenclature reflect the varied ways 
in which this empire was built. These 
did not follow some grand strategy as 
sometimes supposed, but were rather 
determined by victories, defeats 
and compromises both with other 
imperial powers and with indigenous 
leaders, over a long period. Thus for 
example Kenya was a colony, Uganda a 
protectorate, Tanganyika a mandated 
territory, Canada a dominion and 
Sudan a condominium.
The result in this case was that Sudan 
was not governed like a colony or a 
protectorate. Its administrators were 
not members of the colonial service 
and did not report to the Colonial 
Office. Known as the Sudan Political 
Service, they reported directly to 
the Foreign Office through the 
Governor General, sending reports 
also to the British Consul General 
in Cairo (after 1922, restyled the 
Ambassador), who had to manage 
the often tense relationship with the 
Egyptian Government. The British 
administrators of Sudan were not 
allowed to buy or own land there, 
nor were British settlers allowed to 
acquire and farm land there. Thus 
the economic history of Sudan 
followed a different course from 
that of, for example, neighbouring 
Kenya, a settler colony. Both however 
employed District Commissioners 
(DCs) as the key local representatives 
of British rule and it was these DCs 
who had to deal on the ground with 
the consequences of the officials 
of a British colony – Kenya - having 
protracted discussions with those of 
the neighbouring Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium – Sudan - about groups 
of people whose principal economic 
interests were grazing for and the 
security of their cattle, who knew 
little of arcane imperial distinctions. 
Neighbouring administrators may 
have served different masters in 
London, but they came essentially 
from the same culture and usually 
understood each other well enough, 
even if they did not always agree. 
The Condominium lasted from 1898 
to 1955. The independent state of 
the Republic of Sudan was born on 
the 1st January 1956. Kenya attained 
independence in 1963. As noted 
above, both countries inherited 
survey departments that offered 
detailed and useful maps which 
have a value even today. These maps 
show the international boundary as 
a horizontal line agreed by British 
officials in 1913-14. On later maps the 
Provisional Administrative Boundary 
– agreed some years later - is clearly 
shown, but it remained provisional. 
How were those lines on the map 
drawn in the first place?
The Boundary Commission 
Gives Up
In the 19th century, for the policy 
makers of the British Empire, the 
security of the headwaters of the Nile 
was essential for the wellbeing of 
Egypt and thus the economic fortunes 
of the country the British had come 
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to control, if not to rule. But worries about the security of the headwaters of 
the Nile and concerns about the slave trade meant that other areas of East 
Africa would have to come under British control too. Even before Kitchener’s 
expedition up the Nile to “re-conquer” the Sudan and discourage the French 
and the Belgians from encroaching on their sphere of interest, the British had 
concluded that they needed control also of the sources of the river, which were 
thought to be in Uganda, principally in Lake Victoria. (Today Rwanda claims 
the most distant source, a stream in the Nyungwe Forest Park.) So in 1894 
they declared a protectorate in Uganda and began the work of establishing its 
borders, mapping it and administering it. In the area north of Mt. Elgon and 
towards what was then called Lake Rudolph, where the Karamojong and the 
Turkana live today, they found they had to deal not only with Arab and Swahili 
traders and slavers who had come up from the east coast of Africa but also 
with citizens who had come down southwards from another empire, that of 
Abyssinia, who were also trading and buying ivory and slaves and who owed 
allegiance to an African emperor, Menelik the Second.44
British officials in Uganda had succeeded in making a boundary agreement 
with Abyssinia in 1907, which was signed by Menelik, but was contested in 
1910 when the Abyssinians asked the British to remove the boundary markers 
placed by the British Boundary Commissioner at the time, Major C.W. Gwynn. 
This the British did not do, on the strength of the signed agreement they had 
from the Ethiopians. It was in this context, in 1912, that a certain Captain 
Kelly makes an appearance, as Chief Commissioner of the Sudan-Uganda 
Boundary Commission.45 Kelly was a soldier from the British Royal Engineers 
who had been seconded to the Egyptian Army in Sudan since 1903. Here he 
had gained experience in surveying, construction and public works. He had 
also worked on the Sudan-Abyssinia and Sudan-Congo frontiers. For the 
purposes of the Commission, he was teamed with one Captain Tufnell, the 
District Commissioner of Lake Rudolph Province, as it was then termed, in 
Uganda.
The Boundary Commissioners were charged by Reginald Wingate, the 
Governor General of Sudan, with the establishment of a border which “did not 
divide any single tribe between Sudan and Uganda”, between the third and 
the fifth degree latitude north of the Equator, in the area from Nimule, on the 
White Nile, to Lake Rudolph (today Lake Turkana).46 The British wanted the 
riverine post of Nimule to be in the Sudan, because the area of the White Nile 
to its south is navigable as far as Lake Albert (unlike the stretch to the north 
between Nimule and today’s capital, Juba, which has several rapids such as the 
Fula Falls and Bedden that preclude their use by any craft of greater draft than 
a rubber raft). They also wished the border to terminate at Lake Rudolph, where 
they envisaged a possible steamer 
link with what was then British East 
Africa. (It became Kenya Colony 
in 1920.) Thus, for the purposes of 
future trade, they wanted to allow for 
connections between the Sudan and 
both Uganda and Kenya. Kelly even 
talks in his diary of a possible railway 
line between Gondokoro, just north 
of Juba today, and Nimule.
Kelly had to produce a basic map 
and measure distances, all the while 
being responsible for a convoy of 
more than one hundred men, fifty 
camels, three hundred and twenty 
donkeys and twenty mules. He and 
Tufnell only traversed the first 120 of 
the approximately 400 mile boundary 
they were trying to establish 
between the Protectorate and the 
Condominium. This took them 
thirty-two days, at the end of which 
they made draft recommendations 
and Tufnell apparently went on 
leave, after a tour of duty of two 
years without a break. It is clear from 
Kelly’s diary that he thought Tufnell’s 
appointment unfortunate, not only 
because he was very tired but also 
because he was unwilling to comply 
with Kelly’s request that no force be 
used against any of the people they 
encountered en route. 
In his diary, Kelly writes that he was 
surprised at the approach of Uganda 
officials to the local people, calling 
it fortiter in modo – tough in style. 
The use of force ran counter to 
Kelly’s instructions, on the grounds 
that it would reduce the chances 
of British officials in future being 
able to establish friendly relations 
with the people they encountered 
as they brought new areas under 
administration.47 As the official 
responsible for security in the area, 
Tufnell burnt huts and disarmed 
groups of both Acholi and Didinga 
who, he learnt, had been raiding and 
stealing cattle from their neighbours. 
Some Acholi had apparently acquired 
large numbers of old French rifles 
from Abyssinia but Kelly knew well 
that Tufnell’s violent approach made 
the cooperation he needed from local 
people en route very much less likely.
Kelly carried on for about three 
hundred miles without Tufnell, as far 
as Jebel (Mount) Mogila, the twin-
summited hill north of Lokichoggio 
in what is Kenya today - travelling 
perhaps a hundred miles as the crow 
flies. The difference is explained 
by his need to explore and make 
notes on the country and peoples en 
route. Kelly climbed Mogila, on 28 
February 1913, but decided to turn 
back thereafter, having only enough 
fodder for his pack animals for three 
days and being unable to ascertain 
with any accuracy where water could 
be found between there and Lake 
Rudolph. (It was still the dry season, 
although within three days of turning 
back the party experienced a sudden 
heavy rainstorm.)
What in the end did this Boundary 
Commission achieve? Despite the 
early departure of Tufnell, Kelly felt 
that he and Tufnell had gathered 
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enough information and understanding of the terrain and the people that they 
could with some confidence suggest a boundary between Sudan and Uganda, 
from the Nile to Lake Rudolph. This was written up in 1913 in two sets of 
recommendations which can be read today.48 The parts that recommend the 
border in the area of what is today the Ilemi Triangle are as follows:
From here [north of Mt Mogila (appr. Lat. 4 deg 15 N and Long. 34.30 East)] 
a theoretical line to the north of Mt. Lubur on Lake Rudolf is assumed, 
but if the northern portion of the lake proves to be navigable, a strip of 
territory should be reserved to the Soudan, affording a port on the lake. 
East of Mt Harogo49 it has proved impossible for the joint Commission to 
investigate owing to the unfavourable season and the lack of water supply. 
Between this mountain, therefore, and the lake the exact limits remain for 
further consideration when the limits of the Turkana and Dabosa {Toposa] 
grazing rounds are more accurately known.
The Commissioners recognize that owing to the intermixture of the 
various tribes, it is impossible to determine a hard and fast tribal boundary 
and suggest that when the territory on either side of the frontier comes 
to be closely administered, any small alterations which will facilitate 
administration can be effected.
Kelly and Tufnell then added some “rectification notes” which discuss the 
distribution of the Acholi, Toposa and others at the time, as they saw it. They 
noted for example:
Until recently the Dabosa or Tabosa tribes went as far south as Zulia50 
and eastwards as far as Lolimi, and they still claim as far as Mogila for 
their grazing and hunting grounds; they have however been ousted by the 
Turkana, who, it appears, in their time (sic) have been driven from their 
grazing grounds to the north west of the Rudolf plain by Abyssinian raids.
On account of water difficulties, the country east of Loruwama had to be 
visited by the Sudan party alone, which was provided with camel transport; 
no Turkana were met with, but as far as is known, the line from the north 
of Mogila to the north of Jebel Labur and thence to Sanderson Gulf on Lake 
Rudolf will clear all grazing grounds formerly occupied by this tribe.
In the event, this proved not to be the case, the Turkana claimed grazing 
north of the line and this was the reason for the eventual introduction of the 
Provisional Administrative Boundary in 1938, twenty-five years later. 
So Captain Kelly’s findings were 
eventually codified in an “Order in 
Council “in 1914. An order in council 
is a mechanism used in the UK and 
its former territories still, whereby 
a decree is made with the assent of 
the Privy Council, a body of senior 
advisors to the head of state, typically 
at the request of a cabinet minister. In 
this case it was the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, one Lewis Harcourt. 
Thus was the borderline fixed, and 
later delineated with a caveat as to 
its eventual course “a straight line or 
such a line as would leave to Uganda 
the customary grazing grounds of the 
Turkana tribe.”
From Uganda to Kenya: 
The Kitgum Conference and the 
Battle of Kangala 
The situation was complicated by the 
cession of a large block of Ugandan 
territory to Kenya in 1926. This arose 
at the request of British officials in 
Kenya, who convened a conference at 
Kitgum in northern Uganda in 1924 to 
discuss with their counterparts from 
Uganda and Sudan “the safety of the 
North Turkana”, presumably meaning 
their protection from raids by their 
neighbours. In his report on the 
conference Major Brock, the Deputy 
Governor of Mongalla Province (as 
it was at the time) suggested that 
the solution to the issue was to 
control the area north of the 1914 
line. The question was – who would 
control it and who would pay for that 
control? The Kenyan representative 
suggested an area be ceded to Kenya 
while Sudan should administer the 
Toposa to the west of that area and 
contribute to the extra expense that 
would be incurred by Kenya.
The Sudan officials at the time were 
reluctant to accept new expenses and 
had been struggling to avoid taking 
on the Toposa.51 They also pointed 
out that relations with the Egyptian 
Co-dominus were particularly 
bad in the aftermath of the Stack 
assassination and the withdrawal 
of Egyptian troops, and they could 
hardly unilaterally cede what had 
been designated by the Order in 
Council as Sudan territory to a British 
Colony – Kenya. On these grounds, 
the Kitgum conclusions were not put 
into force. Later that year and in the 
following year, the Toposa raided the 
Turkana and the Merille did too. On 
1 February 1926, the Rudolf Province 
was transferred to Kenya Colony, by 
an Order in Council. The Governor 
General of Sudan, Sir Geoffrey 
Archer, wrote subsequently to the 
Governor of Kenya, Robert Coryndon, 
to tell him that the Turkana should 
stay on their side of the border, not 
a very helpful admonition in the 
circumstances, adding he could not 
afford to administer the Triangle or 
supply it. 
Their masters in London then 
reviewed the issue again, taking into 
account the sporadic struggles the 
British had also waged in the area for 
the last ten years against Abyssinian 
ivory poachers and Swahili slavers.52 
Consequently Sir Geoffrey Archer 
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great depression had seen cuts 
in the personnel of the Sudan 
Political Service. The Sudan 
Government was not only short 
of administrators, it could not 
afford to police the area east of 
Kapoeta in order to curb raids on 
the Turkana by Nyangatom and 
Merille. The Kenya Government 
on the other hand was willing to 
find the resources to establish 
police posts and to patrol the area 
from the King’s African Rifles base 
at Lokitaung because officials 
did not want turbulent northern 
tribes disturbing the land given 
to settlers further south, around 
Kitale and Eldoret. For this they 
felt that the Sudan Government 
should pay. After a certain amount 
of haggling, this was agreed and 
the Sudan Government took the 
extraordinary step of paying to the 
Kenya Government £10,000 in 1931 
and the same again in 1932 towards 
the cost of the additional troops it 
felt necessary to keep in Turkana, 
with another £5,500 to pay for new 
roads in the area. This is the origin 
of the administrative presence of 
the Kenyan Government in the 
south of the Triangle today, of 
which more below.
The two administrations also 
agreed informally on the area of 
“the customary grazing grounds of 
the Turkana tribe” in the Triangle 
and drew a line north of the 1914 
line which took in the hills of 
Lorienatom and Lokwanamur, with 
the valley in between them, along 
37
“...they felt 
that the Sudan 
Government 
should pay...”
had to change his mind and 
accept the expense of taking over 
Toposa territory with a company of 
Equatorial troops and setting up a 
base at Lolimi. This was later moved 
to Kapoeta, which is further to the 
west and closer to Torit, the base of 
the Equatorial Corps. 
In 1927 there was a “small incident 
between the police and the Nicor 
section of the Toposa”, according to 
Geoffrey King, who became DC Toposa 
in 1931.53 Otherwise he reported “[t]
here was practically no resistance by 
the Toposa to the Sudan Government 
occupation of their country”. 
In conversation many years later 
with a Toposa elder, I was told “We 
decided not to fight the British, since 
they had lots of guns, but rather to 
watch them and wait and see what 
they did.” By 1928, the Toposa found 
they were being administered by two 
British civilian officials. By 1931, they 
had a District Commissioner, the 
aforementioned Captain King, based 
at an administrative centre, Kapoeta. 
King was to stay with them, with a 
year away as a soldier to assist with 
the campaign against the Italians, 
until he retired in 1952.54 
To the east of Sudan, the Ethiopians 
had defeated an Italian army at 
the Battle of Adowa in 1896. They 
regarded the area around Lake 
Turkana as within their sphere of 
influence, whether for slaving, ivory, 
taxation or trade. While senior British 
officials in Sudan were dithering 
over their frontier responsibilities, 
their counterparts in Kenya sent 
a battalion of the King’s African 
Rifles, in a joint operation with 
troops from the Sudan, to fight and 
drive away Turkana and Ethiopian 
forces at a place called Kangala, just 
south of the area that became the 
Ilemi Triangle. They succeeded in 
driving the Ethiopians off and back 
towards their base at Maji, but the 
Turkana suffered heavy losses in 
cattle from British retribution, which 
then caused a famine .55 This in turn 
led to the opening of a famine relief 
camp at Kalokol in 1924.56 The British 
officials in Uganda and those involved 
later, after the transfer of Rudolph 
Province in 1926 in Kenya, did not 
have the resources to follow up their 
military success and administer the 
Turkana to the north. They contented 
themselves with a base in Lodwar and 
were only able to bring in a civilian 
administration in 1928.
Sudan Draws a Red Line and Pays 
for Patrols
With a District Commissioner 
established at Kapoeta in the Eastern 
District of what was then Mongalla 
Province of the Sudan, who reported 
to the Governor General in Khartoum, 
and a Provincial Commissioner for 
Turkana at Lodwar, who reported 
to the Governor in Nairobi, the two 
British administrations were able 
to discuss the border, raids on the 
Turkana and the northern limits 
of Turkana grazing. Inevitably the 
two administrations had different 
interests. The years after the 
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with some land to the east and to the west, calling it the “Red Line”. This came 
to be described on later maps as the Provisional Administrative Boundary 
(PAB). The heights that lay within this new boundary are set well above the 
flat, seasonally-flooded plains of Lotakippi and Alabilab, hold some springs 
of water and give good views to the north. In the same year, Captain King 
travelled from Kapoeta to Lokitaung in Kenya to see where administrative 
posts might be established. He found sufficient water to the north only at 
the foot of Moru Akippi (the hill of water in Ateker languages), near where 
the Sudan Government later put a Sudan Defence Force base, at Loelli, and at 
Kaimothia (variously also Kamathia, Kaimosia etc) where there is to this day a 
Kenyan police post, inside the PAB. He did not think these were sufficient for 
administration of the area, being too far west of the border with Abyssinia and 
too far from Kapoeta, respectively. 
Empires in Abyssinia: The Italians Come and Go.
The Italian invasion and occupation of Abyssinia in 1935-6 gave the British 
administrators some new counterparts on the borders of Kenya and Sudan. 
It also introduced a new complication. There is a salient of Nuer and Anuak 
speakers protruding into Sudan territory from Gambela in Ethiopia. Or looked 
at from the Sudan side, the Nuer and to some extent the Anuak people found 
themselves on both sides of a protrusion in an imperial border. The country 
is low-lying and swampy. The British and Italians considered swapping this 
salient for a large area of the Ilemi Triangle. Such a move would have brought 
all the Nuer and Anuak under British administration in the Sudan and put the 
Ilemi area under Italian rule, as part of Abyssinia. It would thus have more or 
less straightened the border, giving the Sudan an area of seasonal swamps in 
exchange for the highlands of Boma and the more arid land in the Triangle, and 
bringing the two peoples under one administration, that of the Condominium. 
It would also have ceded part of the Triangle to Kenya, to help the Turkana 
with what was by this time a recognized need for grazing. In 1939 the British 
Government submitted a memorandum to the Italian Government proposing 
the change. It needed, in principle, the assent of the Egyptian Government, 
still nominally a partner in the Condominium, but it was not to be. The rise of 
fascism in Europe, the gathering storm which was about to engulf the world, 
meant that the negotiations were never pursued and the border was never so 
straightened.57 
Instead, the Red Line became the Provisional Administrative Boundary and was 
accepted by the Governments of Kenya and of Sudan at the time as an informal 
administrative measure to allow Kenya access to Sudan in order to protect its 
subjects from raids by the neighbours, if need be. Today this might be called 
the right of hot pursuit. It remained, nonetheless, an uncertain tactic. The US 
historian Robert Collins interviewed 
Captain King in his retirement in 
the UK in 1962. He records King as 
saying that “the Sudan Government 
was none the worse for not being 
the wiser” by officially remaining 
ignorant of the Red Line. Collins also 
reports the Governor of Kenya at the 
time, Sir Joseph Byrne, as saying that 
the administrative boundary was “a 
purely temporary expedient”.58
In Kenya Colony the British and their 
allies prepared for war. Using some 
77,000 troops from the UK, Africa 
and India, they invaded Abyssinia, 
Somalia and Somaliland in 1941 
and drove the Italians out of their 
short-lived East African empire. They 
then created the “Occupied Enemy 
Territory Administration,” OETA, 
but were at pains to explain to the 
Emperor, Haile Selassie, that they 
wanted to hand Abyssinia back to 
him, which in due course they did, 
in 1942, rather than incorporating 
it into the British Empire, which 
the Abyssinians assumed was a real 
possibility. One baleful effect of this 
campaign was the large number of 
weapons left in the hands of the 
Merille, amongst others, in Abyssinia, 
adding to the arms they already held 
which they had acquired previously 
both from the Italians and before 
that by a flourishing arms trade in 
old European rifles. This presented 
a real danger to the Turkana, to the 
south and thus a real concern to the 
Kenya Government, which held that 
the Merille tended to come through 
the Triangle on their raids and it 
was the responsibility of the Sudan 
Government to do something to 
check this.
Colonial Administration: The 
Worlds of Whitehouse and King
From 1928 to 1963, British officials 
in Kenya wrestled with the neglect 
of the Ilemi Triangle by their 
counterparts in Sudan. Ilemi 
remained an area inhabited around 
the edges but largely empty in its 
centre, traversed by raiding parties 
from all sides, beyond the rule of 
law, undeveloped, with a surfeit of 
firearms and no obvious economic 
value to any central government. 
Just before the start of World War II, 
the Sudan Defence Force (SDF) had 
erected a fort, the ruins of which still 
stand today at Loelli. From here, the 
Force did patrol eastwards into the 
Triangle, just as the Kenyan police 
came northwards into the Triangle on 
patrol. The Sudan Government also 
put outposts further to the west, near 
the Lokorowa River. All this had been 
done with the object of discouraging 
any Italian invasion, rather than 
administering the area. 
During World War II, Dick Lyth, 
who had come to South Sudan as a 
missionary, was enrolled as an officer 
in the Sudan Defence Force. From 
Torit, he raised an auxiliary force 
of 120 men, trained them and took 
them into the Triangle, leading them 
on raids up and down the border 
with Ethiopia, from Boma to Lake 
Rudolph, as it then was, in order to 
convince the Italians that the British 
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actually had a much larger force 
available than they did. Lyth was a 
successful guerrilla leader and after 
the war joined the Sudan Political 
Service, becoming the Frontier Agent 
at Boma Plateau, just to the north of 
the Triangle, and subsequently DC 
Akobo, until independence.59 
Denis Zaphiro, who had been an 
officer in the SDF, stationed at Loelli, 
told the writer in later years that he 
had one regret from his soldiering in 
Sudan, when he had come under fire 
from a group of Nyangatom herders 
and had returned fire with a Bren gun, 
driving the herders back across the 
border with Ethiopia. He sympathized 
with their need for pasture and water 
but said he had orders to keep the 
Nyangatom on the other side of the 
border, where they were Ethiopian 
taxpayers. In practice, border officials 
had allowed herders to cross borders 
with their cattle in times of need, but 
only if they did not carry weapons.60 
But the Bren gun was no substitute 
for government and the lack of 
government in Ilemi is its central 
problem to this day.61 
The Sudan Political Service officials 
left the Sudan in 1954 and 1955. 
Their Sudanese successors were able 
to do less than they had in relation 
to the border with Kenya. British 
administrators in Kenya fared no 
better. One leading administrator 
was Leslie Whitehouse (nicknamed 
Wouse by the British and Etawos by 
Ateker speakers), a DC in Turkana 
from November 1946 until his 
retirement in 1958. During this time, 
Whitehouse served as “Jomo’s Jailor” 
when Jomo Kenyatta was imprisoned 
by the colonial administration in 
Lokitaung and later in Lodwar. He 
developed a good relationship with 
Kenyatta, who appointed him a 
magistrate after independence in 
1963. He also worked to settle Kenya’s 
border with Uganda and Ethiopia, for 
which he received the OBE (Order 
of the British Empire) in 1959, and 
knew well the practical problems of 
administering the Ilemi Triangle. 
After retirement, he also became a 
Kenya citizen, when he agreed to 
serve the government of independent 
Kenya as a member of the Kenya-
Sudan Border Commission. Of this 
he wrote: “In the event, I never set 
eyes on the Sudanese Boundary 
Commission and the boundary 
remains undemarcated to this day”.62 
Whitehouse continued to serve as a 
Senior Magistrate in Kenya until his 
death in 1989.
A glance at the regular reports from 
Turkana District during the 1940s 
and 1950s reveals never-ending 
raids, movements northwards by 
the Turkana to seek pasture and 
similar movements westwards and 
southwards respectively by Merille, 
Toposa and Nyangatom, for the same 
reason.63 At a local level, the Kenyan 
DCs cooperated with Geoffrey King, 
their long-serving counterpart in 
Kapoeta, and with Pat de Robeck, 
who joined King as an Assistant DC 
in Kapoeta and was later recruited to 
serve across the border in Turkana, 
after the independence of Sudan. That all were military men is not a surprise 
in that most such administrators in that era had served either in the First or 
the Second World War. Their experience in the forces would have been judged 
important when dealing with a rugged frontier and peoples who to this day 
possess many guns and do not lightly accept the hand of government.
Another feature of what was becoming a flexible border is one more line added 
to the maps to indicate the limits up to which the Kenyan authorities could 
patrol. The “Red Line”, or PAB, was drawn in 1938, but constant raiding meant 
that in 1947 the Kenyan government agreed with the Government of Sudan to 
adopt a new line, which they dubbed the Blue Line, sometimes known also as 
the Sudan Patrol Line, extending the area which Kenya could control further 
to the north and to the west (see sketch below).64 This was one more example 
of a local response to an unresolved international boundary, but it did not 
change the fundamental problem that the only way of setting an international 
boundary is by bilateral agreement, with a treaty between the two governments 
concerned, not by drawing new lines on an old map. 
The point is made because the exact position and significance of the Red 
Line and the Sudan Patrol Line has generated detailed analyses by, for 
example, Dr. Muaz Tungo, the Sudanese scholar cited above on p.10, and by 
the Kenyan analyst Nene Mburu.65 It is perfectly possible that, in any future 
border settlement, Kenya and South Sudan may well agree that the Red Line 
or the Blue Line would afford a feasible border, but these lines remain just a 
manifestation of local administrative arrangements necessitated by the lack 
of will and resources on the part of the Government of Sudan to demarcate a 
border and govern whatever part of Sudan lay within the demarcation. The 
most important of the lines remains the Red Line, or PAB, because within that 
line lie Kenyan police posts and the visible and tangible evidence of Kenyan 
investment and Kenyan governance. Between this line and the 1914 border, 
the surveyors calculated was an area of 1,347 square miles.66 
Interestingly, because of its importance, the line of the PAB was very accurately 
recorded and marked, with beacons, when it was surveyed in 1938, providing 
thus a rare section of Sudan’s border both delimited, delineated and demarcated 
too. The work was done for Sudan by King, as DC Kapoeta, by Wakefield, the 
Director of the Sudan Survey Department and by Whalley, the former consul 
at Maji, who was the first person to publish a description of the Triangle (see 
p.7 above). For Kenya, they were accompanied by Thompson, the Provincial 
Commissioner, Turkana, by MacKay, the DC Lodwar, by Kean, of the 4th Kings 
African Rifles at Lokitaung, and one Morris, “Military Representative.” They 
spent 18 days on the task, walking, using motor vehicles and riding donkeys. 
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They also climbed the mountain 
Lorienatom. Each of the 21 points 
they fixed was recorded by latitude 
and longitude, height above sea 
level, distance from the next point 
and lastly bearing to the next point.67 
This, at least, was not a poorly drawn 
border, but one fixed and recorded by 
men who knew the area and had most 
of the responsibility for administering 
it at that time.
There is one more legacy of the 
colonial administration - the 
existence of a Kenyan police post and, 
today, administrative centre with its 
own District Officer, at Kibish. Kibish 
is about 120 km. north of Lokitaung 
and offered a source of water for 
the Kenyan patrols into the Triangle 
which started in Lokitaung. But it 
lies on the very eastern edge of the 
Triangle, astride the Ethiopia – Sudan 
border, well to the north of any line, 
Blue Red or other. 
A former DC, Chenevix Trench, 
describes in his memoir how he took a 
patrol there from Lokitaung, entered 
Sudan, reached the Tepes Hills and 
had to turn back with his men to his 
last water source in Kibish. He knew 
full well that he was patrolling in 
Sudan, but he also knew that local 
arrangements entitled him to be 
there. (He also noted that he had 
shot an eland near the hills, for food, 
without a Sudan Game Licence, since 
he had no means of obtaining one.)
As the independence of Sudan approached, a query came from the colonial 
government in Kenya as to whether its concerns about the status of the border 
at the Ilemi Triangle could somehow be set out in a “formal undertaking for 
the close administration of the area.” In the correspondence quoted in the 
Introduction above, Sir William Luce continued thus: “We cannot but feel 
that, whatever undertaking might be given to this effect, it would inevitably 
be of little value, since the future administration of this area is likely to prove 
even less close than that exercised hitherto.”68 He was right.
iV. independence
Serial Neglect?
In 1963, according to a document marked Top Secret at the time, the Council 
of Ministers in independent Sudan heard from Mohamed Ahmed Irwa, the 
Minister of the Interior, referring to the Sudan-Kenya border, that
It has become imperative to restore the administration of this area 
(i.e. Ilemi) but, owing to the lack of information and the establishment 
of Administrative officials, security forces and other installations, it 
is advisable that the question be deferred for the time being until we 
collect the data concerning this area. The officials who will be detailed 
to reconnoitre this area will take the utmost care of secrecy so that none 
could be in position to reveal our plans to the other side.69 
For the next ten years however, Sudan was preoccupied with a civil war, fought 
against the Anyanya guerillas of the South. When it ended, in 1972, the South 
had attained a degree of regional autonomy, and was the scene of modest 
outside aid and commercial investment, until the civil war re-started in 1983. 
In the late 1970s, during that brief interlude of regional autonomy and relative 
peace, I recall hearing about the Ilemi Triangle, the still little-known area near 
the Kenya border, and asking the then Governor of Equatoria, Peter Cirillo, 
what the regional government proposed to do there. As I recall, his answer was 
that they would bring administration and development. The civil war fought 
by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) against the Government of 
Sudan from 1983 to 2005 soon put an end to that idea.
Ethiopia too had its own wars to contend with, in the Ogaden from 1977-78, 
against the Eritrean Liberation Front from 1961-93 and against the newly-
independent Eritrea from 1999-2000. Ethiopia of course has a border with 
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The Blue Line, proposed in 1947 as a new limit for patrols from Kenya.
South Sudan, part of which is the eastern side of the Ilemi Triangle but, after 
the fall of Mengistu, Ethiopia was not much involved in Sudan affairs until 
it sent peacekeeping troops to the UN Mission to Abyei (UNISFA) in 2007. 
Ethiopia also took over the chair of IGAD from Kenya and then led, with mixed 
results, the peace process underway in South Sudan until, effectively, it was 
pushed aside by Presidents Bashir and Museveni in 2018.
Against this complicated regional and international shifting of alliances and 
interests, John Garang’s SPLA suffered a heavy blow in 1991 with the defection 
of Riek Machar, who took many Nuer troops with him. Having enjoyed much 
success from 1983 to 1991, the SPLA was now pushed back southwards towards 
Nimule and was short of troops. Its troops in the Toposa and Nyangatom 
areas to the east of Kapoeta were not from the area and often did not get 
on with the local peoples, who are well armed and famously tough. So John 
Garang cut a deal with local leaders: they would supply Toposa recruits for 
training and the SPLA would withdraw its other forces from Toposa, so that 
some of these recruits could replace them. The arrival of fresh recruits from 
Nyangatom, Toposa and Boya peoples undoubtedly helped Garang restore his 
position on the battlefield. In addition, thanks to the wily stratagem of the late 
Father George Kinga, who had actually been a minister in the government in 
Khartoum, his Toposa supporters received new G3 rifles from the government 
in Juba, ostensibly to fight the SPLA. Most of them then defected to the SPLA/M, 
walking home from Juba with their weapons. Having armed his people, Father 
George then defected too.70 To this day the Toposa remain heavily armed.
In 2013, after the secession of South Sudan, the author recalls meeting again 
with a senior official of the new Government of South Sudan and enquiring 
whether he was aware of the issue of the Ilemi Triangle. His reply recalled what 
I had heard nearly twenty five years before from Peter Cirillo. The government 
was indeed aware of the issue, which could only be solved by administering 
the area, but had more pressing issues to manage before it could take on the 
question of the border with Kenya. 
Two years later, on a visit to the area, I carried a twelve-volt battery to the 
hamlet of Lotimor, near the Ethiopian border within the Ilemi Triangle, so 
that the handful of policemen there could at least communicate with Kapoeta, 
200kms away to the west on very bad roads, by radio. Government of the area 
was still no more established there than it had been a hundred years before, 
although many political leaders in South Sudan are well aware of the Ilemi 
anomaly.
Different Histories
As regards Kenya, the authorities 
showed little more interest in the 
Ilemi Triangle, until 1986 (see below). 
There was nonetheless an attempt, 
not long after independence, to get 
the UK, as the departed colonial 
power, to help Kenya assert a claim 
on that part of the Ilemi Triangle 
within the PAB, which met with no 
success. A letter from Kenya to the 
UK government, according to Tungo, 
stated “We cannot wait indefinitely 
for a new official Kenya-Sudan 
Agreement; I suggest that the British 
official maps should follow our lead 
on the Red Line”.
The Directorate of Overseas Surveys 
responded as follows:
……although the then Sudanese 
and Kenyan Governments 
were authorized in 1939 by His 
Majesty’s Government to accept 
and refer to the Red Line as 
the Provisional Administrative 
Boundary, the line never received 
full recognition from all those 
concerned. Accordingly we feel we 
cannot show on our maps the Red 
Line as the accepted international 
boundary, on the information at 
present available to us . . . 71 
Tungo records also a note from 
the Kenya Government to the 
Government of Sudan in October 
1988 notifying the Sudanese that the 
arrangement should be terminated, 
claiming that the Ilemi Triangle is 
an integral part of Kenya.72 Sudan 
– according to Tungo - rejected this 
claim on legal grounds.
If nature abhors a vacuum, then a 
state which cannot patrol its borders 
or govern those within them risks 
losing its ability to govern altogether, 
not to speak of its credibility. The 
different trajectories of Sudan and 
Kenya since independence explain 
the neglect of an important border 
by Sudan, and later by South Sudan, 
and the slow but steady progress 
northwards of Kenyan government 
influence. Sudan has been beset 
by civil war and economic collapse 
while Kenya has managed to avoid 
civil war, develop the institutions of 
state and grow its per capita income 
more successfully. Sudan also has 
other troublesome border areas to 
consider, such as the Halaib Triangle 
on its northern border, which was 
taken over by Egypt and over which 
it therefore lost de facto control. The 
dispute once more involves a 1902 
border adjustment carried out by the 
British to allow the Egyptian Ababda 
to graze in Sudan and the Sudanese 
Beja to graze their camels in Egypt. 
The Egyptians have invested in the 
area and have apparently refused to 
submit to international arbitration.73
V. The Ethiopian Border of the 
Triangle 1902-1972
The Government of Ethiopia has 
so far been a mostly silent player in 
this story, but they watched British 
activities in their neighbouring 
countries carefully. In 1902, the 
British Government, having access 
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to military surveyors in the Egyptian Army, sent a certain Captain Maud to 
suggest the best line for the borders of Ethiopia with Sudan and Kenya. (While 
he was doing that, another surveyor, Major H.H. Austin attempted to survey 
the area from the Sobat to Lake Rudolf, but ran short of supplies and lost a 
large number of his men to local resistance and to shortages of food.)74 The 
Ethiopians were ambivalent, nervous of possible British designs on their 
territory, just as they were also after the liberation of Ethiopia forty years later. 
Subsequently, in 1907, the British sent Charles Gwynn to demarcate Maud’s 
line on the ground. Gwynn had already prospected the area from the Blue Nile 
to the Sobat River in 1899, after the Battle of Omdurman, and he built cairns 
to mark the border line he was demarcating. 
After his trek, Gwynn proposed a number of changes to the lines Maud 
had suggested, largely to keep highland Ethiopians in Ethiopia and Nilotic 
peoples in Sudan, so that much of the border followed the base of the 
Ethiopian escarpment. The changes were accepted by the British, if not by 
the Ethiopians, and Gwynn’s line for the most part forms the border today. 
In retirement Gwynn wrote a piece for the Journal of the Royal Geographical 
Society describing the rigours and challenges of foot safaris in remote areas 
at the limits of control for both Sudan and Ethiopian governments at the 
time.75 Unable to get a qualified counterpart from the Ethiopian bureaucracy, 
Gwynn had to undertake his Sudan-Ethiopia survey alone. It seems however 
that he won the trust of the Emperor Menelik, through the good offices of 
Harrington, the British representative in Addis Ababa. Menelik was willing 
to accept Gwynn’s suggested line, at least in private. It was never publicly 
acknowledged by the Ethiopians on the grounds that it was drawn without 
the participation of an Ethiopian government surveyor, but it was in practice 
accepted through an exchange of notes in 1972.76 As regards the portion 
setting the eastern border of the Triangle, it ended where the meridian line 
of 6 degrees North met the line of 35 degrees East, but this tri-junction point, 
where Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan were to meet, has remained un-demarcated 
and not properly surveyed to this day.
The problem of Merille raiders crossing from Ethiopia to raid the Turkana in 
Kenya, going through the Ilemi Triangle, remained. The British convened a 
peace meeting at Lake Rudolph in 1934 and got representatives of Dassenech, 
Nyangatom and Turkana to agree to end raids and live in peace with their 
neighbours, the first of many such meetings which produced an agreement 
not destined to last.77 
Eventually the Government in Sudan and that in Addis Ababa did set up a Joint 
Boundary Commission, the Abebe-Clifford Commission, which started work in 
1951 and finished in 1955. Again the 
Ethiopians accepted its findings, in 
practice, but declined to ratify them. 
It was only in 1964 that Kenya and 
Ethiopia reaffirmed their boundary, 
confirming Kenyan sovereignty over 
the police post of Namuruputh, which 
is just south of the south-eastern 
point of the Triangle as delineated 
by Gwynn. Later, in 1972 they agreed 
a minor boundary alteration but did 
not involve Kenya. They did however 
confirm that Ethiopia had no claim to 
the Ilemi Triangle .78 In this regard at 
least, the Ethiopians have played no 
further part in boundary discussions.
VI. Kenya and the Triangle 1987-
2017
Kenya’s apparent lack of interest in 
the Triangle during the 1960s and 
1970s did not last into the 1990s. 
During the SPLA war, Kenya had 
worked to maintain good relations 
with Khartoum whilst at the same 
time allowing the SPLM/A to operate 
out of Nairobi and use Kenya, 
effectively, as a rear base, with even 
a frontier post called Keybase, just 
outside Lokichoggio, where SPLA 
soldiers could leave their weapons 
when they entered Kenya. 
Kenya also played a central role in 
the negotiations which culminated in 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
of 2005 and were led by the Kenyan 
General Sumbeiywo. The CPA brought 
an end to the civil war and enabled the 
referendum which, in 2011, produced 
the new state of South Sudan.
Further to the east, Kenya’s approach 
was much less accommodating. It 
appears that in July 1988 a huge 
Nyangatom cattle raid took place 
against the Merille. When Kenyan 
police from Kibish intervened, they 
were outnumbered and outgunned. 
Fifteen Kenyan policemen were 
killed. For the next six weeks, Kenyan 
security forces are thought to have 
killed 200 raiders in retaliation, with a 
further 500 estimated civilian deaths, 
using jet aircraft to strafe villages.79 
The government in Sudan is reported 
to have protested, but they did not 
control the area – once again nobody 
was in control. Kenya’s response 
was to build up Kibish as the HQ of 
a new division of Turkana District, 
establishing a district officer in Kibish, 
bringing in the General Service Unit 
(GSU), administrative police and 
missionaries and tendering for the 
building of Health Centre in Kibish.80 
“Miskini” (poor) Turkana were 
encouraged to settle around Kibish 
and the European Community funded 
the Turkana Rehabilitation Project. 
Today all Kenyan maps show Kibish 
as a part of Kenya.
As explained at the beginning of 
chapter I, maps of Kenya started to 
show a new border line, a line which 
went from the north of Mogila to 
somewhere around the mountains 
on the Ethiopia border, Tomadur 
and Naita. It is commonly supposed 
that John Garang, the leader of the 
SPLM/A, had privately reached an 
agreement with President Moi not 
to object to Kenya’s presence in the 
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Triangle in return for the logistical and practical facilities to which the SPLA 
had access in Kenya during its war against the government in Khartoum. 
John Garang was killed in a helicopter crash in 2005 and President Moi has 
remained silent on the matter. 
There could have been several reasons why the two leaders reached some kind 
of tacit agreement. As noted above, oil companies were showing interest in 
the area and Tullow Oil eventually found commercial quantities of oil, albeit 
in South Turkana, in 2012. And like its colonial predecessor, the Government 
of Kenya felt it had a duty to protect the Turkana from their cattle-raiding 
neighbours. In addition, an unpoliced border with South Sudan made easier 
the busy trade in AK 47 rifles and other weapons and ammunition. So, over a 
number of years Kenya did what it thought necessary to police the border and 
push back those of the neighbours adjudged to be a threat. 
Whether or not any agreement between John Garang and Daniel Arap Moi 
existed, written or otherwise, more and more Kenyan maps began to show the 
45 degree line from Mt. Mogila to Mt. Naita or thereabouts, while all maps 
originating in Sudan showed the horizontal 1914 line. And so the 45 degree 
line spread, from Al Jazeera to the British High Commission in Kenya and to 
the British Embassy in Juba, as more and more maps that had not originated 
in Kenya also showed this line.81 There was even such a map produced in the 
Office of the Vice-President of South Sudan, until he was asked by people from 
the area not to show their homes as part of Kenya. 
The change did not pass unnoticed by the Kenyan public and one or two officials. 
MP Paul Muite for example raised it in parliament in the 1990s. In 1992 the 
Indian Ocean Newsletter reported that Kenya had plans to annex the area and 
described the construction that had taken place at Kibish since 1987.82 
From 1989 to 2005, Lokichoggio itself was the forward operating base for 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), at the time the world’s largest humanitarian 
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“The change did not 
pass unnoticed by the 
Kenyan public...”
operation, which took aid and aid 
workers into the SPLA-controlled 
areas of South Sudan under a unique 
agreement whereby the government 
in Khartoum agreed with the SPLM/A 
to allow relief supplies to reach both 
government and rebel-held areas.
For Kenya this was a diplomatic 
balancing act, as President Moi 
managed to maintain relations with 
the regime in Khartoum, whilst 
allowing a certain license to the 
SPLM/A to have access to Kenya and 
its facilities. Thousands of refugees 
from South Sudan were hosted by 
Kenya and Nairobi was the regular 
venue for diplomatic discussions, 
peace meetings and residence for 
many South Sudanese who could 
afford it. The border crossing just 
north of Lokichoggio, on the road to 
Narus and Kapoeta, was very busy 
and the purchasing power of the 
relief operation injected substantial 
funds into the Kenya economy. The 
operation also meant that relief 
workers occasionally went into the 
western part of Ilemi Triangle and the 
World Food Programme encouraged 
the peoples of the area with food aid 
to rebuild the old British military 
access roads to Loelli, Nanyangacor 
and Lotimor, which sits beneath 
Tomadur, on the Ethiopian border. 
The SPLA had a garrison at Lotimor 
and for some time a missionary clinic 
operated there. The ending of OLS 
meant that the area was neglected 
once more and the church people 
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Hand-drawn borders, from the map purchased by the author in Nairobi in 1987
moved westwards to Nanyangacor, 
regarding Lotimor as too remote.
Although Kenya had been involved 
in the peace process which ended the 
1962-1955 civil war in South Sudan83 
, there had been little awareness in 
Kenya of events in their troubled 
northern neighbor’s southern areas. 
This changed when many Kenyans 
became aid workers in South Sudan 
under OLS, between 1989 and 2005. 
They began to understand some 
of the dynamics of their troubled 
neighbor and this, along with Kenya’s 
role in the peace negotiations, meant 
that, almost for the first time, Kenyan 
officials too gained an understanding 
of what was going on in South 
Sudan. The IGAD peace process for 
Sudan was chaired by the Kenyan 
General Sumbeiywo, a large part 
of the negotiations was conducted 
there and when the CPA was signed 
in Nairobi in 2005, the Kenyan and 
Ugandan presidents witnessed it. 
Just before the signing of the CPA, 
in 2003, the Governments of Sudan 
and of Kenya agreed to form a joint 
border committee “to deal with the 
twin issue of cattle rustling and the 
proliferation of illicit weapons.” 
They recognized that a solution 
to the civil war in southern Sudan 
was a necessary first step. However, 
independent Sudan’s officials had 
never visited the Ilemi Triangle, so 
far as is known, let alone controlled it, 
and when the Comprehensive Peace 
was signed two years later, in 2005, 
Kenya had to deal more and more 
with the transitional government 
in Juba, which was concentrating 
on the referendum which led to the 
secession of the South, and not with 
officials in Khartoum. 
It is worth noting here that the CPA 
defined South Sudan as the area 
within the boundaries of southern 
Sudan at the time of independence. 
Since then, much time has been 
devoted to an illusory search for 
the “British map of 1956”. No such 
map exists, because the British 
administration was winding down in 
1954 and 1955 and Sudan’s first day of 
Independence was January 1st 1956. 
What does exist however, is a 1940 
map corrected in January 1955, at a 
1:2 million scale, along with all the 
district maps at a scale of 1:250,000.84 
These Sudan Survey maps remain the 
basis for most maps produced since.
Early in 2005, Kenya’s Land Minister 
Amos Kimunya announced “the Elemi 
Triangle is part of Kenya.” He also said 
there were beacons confirming that it 
was in Kenya, referring presumably to 
the cairns put along the line of the PAB 
by Captain King and his party in 1938. 
This was disputed by a Kenyan writer, 
Peter Mwaura, in the Daily Nation, 
in a piece dated July 16th 2005, in 
which he wrote that “Kenya’s claim 
to sovereignty over the territory at 
the corner of Kenya-Sudan-Ethiopia 
boundary is precarious.” All through 
these years, there had been a slow 
but steady stream of articles in the 
Kenyan press about fighting and cattle 
raids at the border. Unsurprisingly, no 
one writing seemed to know where 
the border was and it was not always 
quite clear who the cattle raiders had 
been, whether Ethiopian, Sudanese 
or even Kenyan.85 
All the while the Kenyan authorities 
continued their control of these 
colonial police posts along the line of 
the PAB and also of their road access 
from Lokitaung to their post at Kibish, 
on the Ethiopian border. The Kenya 
Defence Force also had and still has a 
base in Lokichoggio, at the foot of Mt. 
Mogila but not within the Triangle, to 
secure the main border crossing with 
South Sudan.86 Just up the road is the 
hamlet of Nadapal. This became the 
scene of another violent incident in 
2009, when Toposa youths attacked 
Kenyans who had come to build 
Kenyan border facilities at Nadapal, 
saying that the work was being done 
inside South Sudan and was part 
of a move to secure grazing for the 
Turkana at the expense of the Toposa. 
The violence was in the context 
of continued cross-border raiding 
and banditry on the Lokichoggio-
Kapoeta Road over many years, to the 
extent that the then GoSS Minister 
for Internal Affairs, Gier Chuang 
Aluong, “admitted that Toposa are 
heavily armed and outside control of 
Southern Sudan’s government. We 
are really not governing the Toposa,” 
said the minister, adding that the 
SPLM was not arming the Toposa. He 
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The Ilemi portion of the last “British” map of Southern Sudan, at a scale of 1:2,000,000, corrected in 
January 1955.
also said the Toposa “have been made 
to believe their land is being taken 
away by Kenya Government.”87
During OLS, in 1999, the International 
Bureau for Animal Research began 
veterinary work with the Toposa and 
Turkana, which helped foster a period 
of peace. When OLS ended, in 2005, 
veterinary services in South Sudan 
lost their main source of support. The 
Government of South Sudan took 
over and proved unable to sustain the 
work. A series of peace conferences 
and meetings began, which continue 
to this day, in Lokichogio, Lodwar, 
Kapoeta and elsewhere, with 
representation from governments, 
local government, elders, chiefs, 
youths, and, occasionally, women. 
Typically, all the Ateker speakers 
would send representatives, the 
parties would agree on what they 
wanted to restore calm and end raids 
and banditry, declarations would be 
signed and an uncertain peace would 
hold until some group of frustrated 
warriors appeared and restarted 
cattle raiding or armed robbery.
The main conclusions of the Kapoeta 
meeting in October 2014, which the 
writer attended, were typical:
i. International border issues 
must be left to heads of state to 
resolve (author’s note. This put 
the issue of the borders at the 
Ilemi Triangle to one side for the 
purposes of the meeting).
ii. The Ateker peoples should 
organize regional disarmament 
within the next three years, in 
order to promote regional peace 
and security, as Uganda has done 
with the Karamojong
iii. The Ateker should strengthen 
and revive cross-border peace 
committees
iv. They must invest in roads, 
telephone networks, schools, 
health centres, security and 
veterinary services
v. Pastoralists must enjoy 
unimpeded movement and share 
grazing and water
vi. Cattle raiding must be ended, as 
it has been in Karamoja
vii. They must promote Ateker culture 
across the borders, develop a 
website and news service, along 
with mobile and boarding schools 
to educate Ateker children, 
regardless of national origin or 
place of residence
viii. They must find ways to protect 
their remaining wildlife, given 
that the “largest unknown 
migration in Africa” uses a 
good portion of Ateker territory, 
and they must conserve their 
environment.
ix. They must promote their culture, 
hold cultural festivals and regular 
meetings and celebrations
x. They must devise a mechanism 
to implement these resolutions, 
recommending some measures 
to national government, but 
entrusting the rest to the Ateker 
Foundation as a fund-raiser and 
custodian, which will need a 
secretariat for this purpose
xi. They need more meetings to 
spread the word. Such gatherings 
must also honestly evaluate 
progress since the last meeting.
The unanimity of analysis was 
striking: “We were poor, conflict-
ridden and marginalized. Now we 
have awoken from our sleep.” “We 
must help ourselves and then others 
will help us too.” The author was 
asked to spread the word also and 
explain the plans to “donors and 
partners.”
At government level, the humiliation 
of two Kenyan government ministers 
en route to Nadapal in July 2009, 
when they were turned back by 
SPLA soldiers, led to a series of 
inter-governmental meetings which 
resulted in more declarations of intent 
and assurances of friendship and 
cooperation. A joint border meeting 
in Nairobi in 2009 for example agreed, 
amongst other things, “to establish 
a joint technical team to demarcate 
the actual boundary between the two 
countries at an appropriate time.”
The issue was now taking on the 
character of a dispute and had come 
into the public domain once more. 
For example the Sudan Radio Service 
in Nairobi reported as follows on 22 
August 2012:
A South Sudanese diplomat has 
denied media reports that South 
Sudan had written a letter to 
the AU and UN saying that the 
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The view from Google – a surplus of borderlines.
contentious Ilemi Triangle belongs to it. The two countries claim ownership 
of the mineral-rich area.
On Tuesday, Kenya’s NTV quoted assistant Foreign Affairs minister, 
Richard Onyonka, as saying that Kenya was planning to hold talks with 
South Sudan, and that the triangle would remain Kenyan territory, as it is 
depicted on Kenyan maps.
In response to the claim, South Sudan’s Ambassador to Kenya, Majok 
Guandong denied having written any letter to the United Nations and the 
African Union. “The media is trying to magnify issues, trying to bring about 
some difficulties between the two counties. There is no such claim. We 
have not claimed this. Both sides know the position of the Ilemi Triangle.
“When we demarcated our borders with other states, we did not demarcate 
our borders with Kenya and Ethiopia. And we knew it because they are our 
brothers. I don’t think there will be any problem at all on this issue,” said 
Mr. Guandong.
When asked where the Ilemi Triangle is exactly located, Guandong response 
was, “You know the answer yourself, why do you ask for something that you 
already know.”
The Joint Border Commission
In due course a Joint Border Commission was established and in 2016 it 
appointed a Joint Technical Team (JTT) to demarcate the border. Hon. David 
Mayo, an MP from South Sudan, prepared two papers summarizing the history 
of Ilemi, examining the legalities and suggesting ways forward.88 The parties 
prepared a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and members of the South 
Sudan team received training in Addis Ababa at the African Union Border 
Programme. Since then South Sudan’s own internal difficulties appear to 
have slowed progress as regards demarcation of a border with Kenya. While 
the MoU for the Kenya-South Sudan Commission still awaits signature at the 
time of writing, its sister Commission, dealing with the Uganda-South Sudan 
border, has already met and visited the area in question.
The delay in settling the South Sudan’s south eastern border, which has lasted 
now for 107 years, has of course not passed unnoticed. On 10th June 2019, 
Epone Emmanuel Lolimo, MP for Kapoeta State, wrote to the Speaker of the 
Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) in Juba concerning the 
“recent encroachment by the Government of Kenya (GoK) into Kapoeta State, 
South Sudan”, referring to developments in the Nadapal area and claiming 
that the GoK planned to put troops 
into the Ilemi Triangle and “to engulf 
the Ilemi Triangle for the purposes 
of drilling oil”, requesting a response 
from ministers of the TGoNU.
Not long after, the Kenyan press 
reported that the Kenyan and South 
Sudanese Foreign Ministers, Monica 
Juma and Nhial Deng Nhial, had 
signed another Memorandum of 
Understanding “to fast track the 
territorial border reaffirmation at 
Ilemi Triangle as a step towards 
the realization of peace between 
the two countries”, an interesting 
formulation which suggests the two 
countries might not be at peace. 
The Ministers also promised to take 
measures to enhance trade and 
bilateral relations between the two 
countries and said that the framework 
agreement they would prepare would 
be put to Presidents Kiir and Kenyatta 
at a meeting to be scheduled later in 
the year.89 Perhaps the Ilemi border 
issue will at last be settled by the two 
governments principally concerned. 
Time will tell.
A Note on Sources
A surprising amount has been written 
about the Ilemi Triangle in the last 
century. The colonial records are 
extensive but, for the period since, 
I have had to rely of on my own 
personal experiences, interactions 
with officials and others from the 
area and the press reports, maps and 
publications I have collected over the 
last forty years.
For this paper, in the time available, 
I was not able to consult the Kenyan 
National Archives in Nairobi or the 
National Archives in Khartoum. I was 
however able to visit the National 
Archives in Kew and look at some of 
the correspondence between Sudan 
officials, the Foreign Office and the 
Colonial Office and of course to look 
at the papers of retired officials in the 
Sudan Archive in Durham. Given the 
vicissitudes of history and conflicts, 
it is possible that I have missed 
some key document in Khartoum or 
Nairobi, but between them Durham 
and Kew can be expected to have 
covered the essential documents 
from the colonial period, since such 
documents would have been copied 
between the Colonial Office, the 
Foreign Office, Cairo, Khartoum and 
Nairobi. 
In 2016, I was also able briefly to 
consult the archives which the Rift 
Valley Institute is digitizing in Juba 
and look at an undated Ilemi file, 
which contains what appear to be 
parts of a 276 page draft manuscript 
on “The Diplomatic Evolution and 
the Legal Status of the International 
Boundaries Between The Sudan 
and Kenya, by Dr. Bukhari Abdalla 
el Gaali, who is today Professor 
of International Law, Al-Nilein 
University, Khartoum, and was at 
the time of his manuscript Secretary 
of the Sudanese International 
Boundaries Commission.90 
Of great use also are A.C. McEwen, 
International Boundaries of East 
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Africa, (Oxford 1971) and Gerald 
Blake, Imperial Boundary making - the 
Diary of Captain Kelly and the Sudan-
Uganda Boundary Commission of 1913 
(Oxford, 1997). (Kelly’s diary can be 
examined in the Sudan Archive in 
Durham, although the handwriting is 
sometimes hard to decipher.)
Amongst writings by Sudanese, South 
Sudanese or Kenyan scholars, I have 
consulted
Faisal Abdel Rahman Ali Taha, ‘The 
Sudan Kenyan Boundary’, Sudan 
Notes and Records, Vol. 56, 1975. This 
gives a brief, clear and useful account 
of the history of the Triangle and the 
legal arguments around it.
Dr. Muaz A M Tungo, The Ilemi Triangle, 
Sudan-Kenya Disputed Boundary 
(Khartoum University Press, 2008). 
Like Taha, the author did his research 
for a PhD dissertation at Cambridge 
University, submitted on 1997. The 
author did a prodigious amount of 
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Ethiopia (Vita House Ltd, 2007). This 
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information is used for its qualitative 
value.”
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Simala), which I have not been able to 
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and Conflict in the Ilemi Triangle 
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Origins and Evolution of Kenya’s 
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2016. This contains a useful summary 
of the history of Ilemi, pp160-177.
As regards international scholars, the 
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the University of California at Santa 
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Sudan. Chapter 3 of his Shadows 
in the Grass (Yale University Press, 
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secondary source.
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his When Boundaries Become Borders 
(Rift Valley Institute, 2010), pp 96-
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Documents on the End of Empire 
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